ophthalmoscopy and reveal conditions which were invisible with the presentday illuminants.
In conclusion, the speaker said that while he had taken upon himself the task of recording these appearances of war injuries for the benefit of those ophthalmologists who had not had the honour of serving in the R.A.M.C., he ventured to hope that investigators other than ophthalmologists might in time come to find in them evidence, if not proof, of theories concerning changes in tissues not exclusively pertaining to the eye.
Supplementing the drawings of war injuries, a number of illustrations of unusual pathological or congenital conditions were shown.
Medical Organization, with Special Reference to the Transportation of Wounded, in Open Warfare. By H. W. GRATTAN, C.B.E., D.S.O., Colonel A.M.S.
IT was my intention to deal with the transportation of wounded from the point of view of a Division and Corps, but having found it impossible to crowd so important a subject into a short paper, I propose to confine my remarks chiefly to the medical organization and administration of the medical service of a division. This paper is based on three years' experience on the Western Front as an Ambulance Commander, A.D.M.S. of a Division and D.D.M.S. of an Army Corps, and includes service in four different armies on many fronts extending from Ypres to St. Quentin where at one period the Sixth Division, of which I was A.D.M.S., held the post of honour on the right of the British Army next the French during our advance in the autumn of 1918.
During trench warfare, which is in reality siege warfare, the transportation of wounded did not present the variety of problems for solution as in a war of movement, where, during operations, the medical situation might change every hour or half hour. I would lay stress on the importance to all administrative medical officers of developing the faculty of anticipating the nature of medical problems in the field, and taking steps to cope with them before they actually occur; with the result that either the undesirable situation does not develop or if it does materialize, it does so in a modified form, and measures to combat it being in readiness are switched on without delay so that there is no check to the evacuation of the wounded.
In laying stress on the importance of foresight I do not refer to such routine matters as an adequate supply of stretchers, blankets, waterproof sheets, dressings, and means for reinforcing bearer personnel; but I refer to a general review of an area before a battle with the aid of a map, or better still, by reconnaissance of the ground, and with a knowledge of the Divisional Commander's intentions, to visualize the most likely outstanding medical difficulties as regards the evacuation of the wounded. . In one instance it was fairly obvious that the evacuation of stretcher cases would be difficult as there was no road leading in the direction of our attack, all the roads running more or less at right angles to the line of our advance. Consequently the location of advanced dressing stations in suitable situations presented some difficulty, but this was overcome by locating them in a town (Le Cateau) outside the divisional area where the majority of roads converged. On another occasion the problem [Decembler 12, 1921. 7 for special consideration was the evacuation of walking wounded owing to the extent of the front held, paucity of motor lorries for walking wounded and the inconvenient route followed by the light railway. The problem was successfully dealt with by utilizing the light railway up to a point nearest to the C.W.W.S. and installing a "ferry" of lorries between that point and the divisional W.W.S., a distance of four miles.
Again, when personnel, equipment, or other form of medical assistance are required in the field, they are wanted at once, there must be no delay or the evacuation of the wounded may be delayed. By this I mean, that the medical personnel should always know the location of the nearest " echelon" of reserves, which can be drawn on in the event of their own reserves becoming dangerously depleted.
(I) When an A.M.D.S. first takes over his duties he may not fully realize the importance of co-operation and co-ordination with other members of the divisional staff, and with the officers commanding certain units of divisional troops, or how success in perfecting arrangements for the succour of the wounded is largely dependent on the liaison of the medical branch with other branches at divisional headquarters. The more this principle of liaison is encouraged and developed the higher the degree of medical efficiency attained, with consequent benefit to the wounded soldier and, incidentally, a lightening of the task of the Administrative Medical Officer.
In reality, divisional and corps headquarters consist of a number of specialists who control and deal with a number of different questions nearly all of which have a direct or indirect bearing on the succour of the wounded in battle. With regard to the tactical disposition of field ambulances the General Staff are interested in the position of main dressing stations, chiefly from the point of view of the possibility of obstruction to the passage of troops, ammunition and supplies by the movements of motor ambulances. In selecting sites for advanced dressing stations in open warfare we were given a free hand, but in trench warfare no new constructional work would be undertaken without conferring with the brigadier concerned and the General Staff.
The General Staff also deals with questions relating to Army Signals and controls the issue of field telephones and their location, with special reference to the possibility of the enemy obtaining information by tapping instruments in an unduly advanced position. The divisional main dressing station was invariably on the telephone and one of the advanced dressing stations as a rule whenever field telephones were in use. The issue of maps is also the province of the General Staff, and because it was considered that the authorized allotment to field ambulances was meagre, we never rested until we obtained a more liberal supply.
The Intelligence branch is also controlled by the General Staff and arrangements were made for the medical branch to be kept informed of the location of all enemy Medical posts which might be utilized as we advanced. The source of this information was obtained from aerial photographs and from interviews with recently captured prisoners. The allotment of fighting troops as bearers in case of necessity was also arranged by the General Staff.
Misunderstandings are nearly always due to faults on both sides. Such a misunderstanding once occurred between the Medical branch and the General Staff when I was A.D.M.S. of a division. When I first took over medical charge of a division the General Staff rather regarded the medical arrangements as automatic, and did not realize how important it was for me to have information regarding pending operations at the earliest possible moment. When once the staff comprehended my difficulties everything worked smoothly.
There is no time to explain in detail how co-operation with all the other branches helped to simplify many medical problems-but my policy was to invoke the aid of all branches, as the wounded have a claim to help and sympathy from all.
The extent of the front held by the division varied. In March, 1917, the division took over a front of 11,000 yards (over 6 miles) from the double-crassier in Loos, to the Hulluch-Hohenzollern sector. At this time, however, the division was reinforced by a fourth brigade. At the battle of Cambrai (November, 1917) the division attacked on a front of 2,600 yards, while at the opening of the German offensive in March, 1918, the division was in the line, N.E. of Bapaume on a front of 4,500 yards. The depth of the area and distance of Divisional Headquarters from the front line varied from 31 to 6 or 7 miles.
(II) The Field Ambulance.-As the duties of ambulance commanders are difficult, trying and dangerous, my policy as an A.D.M.S. was to try to lighten their burden, and to be able to help them at once, with something more substantial than advice when difficulties arose. Knowledge that the A.D.M.S. can help in case of urgent necessity is a source of the greatest relief to ambulance commanders, and enables them to concentrate on local difficulties and speedily overcome them. One of the special troubles was the constant unavoidable changes in personnel-especially of medical officers-to replace casualties among regimental medical officers, or in response to orders to reinforce C.C.S.
It was realized that the highest standard of efficiency was best attained by decentralizing the various duties in the unit in every possible way, in order to leave the ambulance commander free to concentrate on the weak points in his unit and to give him time to think out methods of improving the existing plans of evacuation. Our aim was to organize the ambulances in such a, way that the duties were carried out as well or almost as well when the Commanding Officer was absent.
With regard to their special duties ambulance commanders are specialists in evacuation from the forward area, and the duties include the perfecting of measures for combating shock and collapse, their aim being to get the patient to the C.C.S. within six hours of being wounded, taking every possible precaution to minimize the evil effects of shock. Special stress should be laid on the importance of encouraging and developing initiative in all ranks of the medical service.
ALLOTMENT OF DUTIES TO FIELD AMBULANCES.
Among the important duties are included (a) the collection, treatment and evacuation of lying, and walking wounded and " gassed " cases; (b) the administration of main and advanced dressing stations, walking wounded stations and collecting posts; and (c) the control of motor and horse ambulances. The A.D;M.S. has to decide how these various duties can be most efficiently carried out, in view of the special conditions which obtain at the time, and after I have dealt with the handling of the bearer divisions, I will show in the form of a diagram five different methods of allotting duties to field ambulance commanders.
The Bearer Division.-The efficient handling of the bearer divisions, although it often entails working under most dangerous conditions, is simpler than the management of the tent divisions. The bearer division is a mobile formation and its duties and dispositions are not altered in any way whether Corps Medical Institutions 1 are established or not.
The two principal ways of controlling the three bearer divisions were: either to detail one ambulance commander to be in charge of the evacuation from the forward area and controlling all three bearer divisions; or to divide the responsibility between two ambulance, commanders, placing one in charge of the evacuation from two brigades, and making the other responsible for the remaining brigade.
In every case each bearer division was commanded by an R.A.M.C. bearer officer known as the brigade bearer officer who worked under the orders of the ambulance commander concerned. Under these arrangements there were usually two officers available, including an ambulance commander in case of necessity, to direct and supervise the evacuation of casualties from any one brigade.
In deciding whether to entrust the whole of the forward evacuation to one ambulance commander or to two, the following points would be considered: If the division was on a narrow front of about 3,000 yards, with the initiative in our hands and one main channel of evacuation-then the best and most economical method was to employ only onte ambulance commander to control the three bearer divisions. On the other hand, if the initiative was in the hands of the enemy, or if the tactical situation from a medical point of view was a difficult one, or if the front held by the division was 3,500 yards or more, or if there were two distinct channels of evacuation-one on either flank-then the best results were obtained by dividing this duty between two ambulance commanders.
The work of the bearers is the most important duty of the field ambulance, and however high the standard of surgical aid is at the advanced and main dressing stations, it cannot compensate for or neutralize the evil effects which result from failure on the part of the bearers to bring the patients back at the earliest possible moment.
Efficient bearer work entails: (a) Adequate means for keeping in constant touch with the regimental medical detachment; (b) reserves of personnel and equipment so placed that they are available immediately when required.
The weakest link in the chain of the bearer organization is at the regimental aid post, where a break or interruption in the evacuation of stretcher cases is most likely to occur, and in order to maintain communication with the constantly shifting regimental aid posts, the following measures were adopted:-From four to eight R.A.M.C. bearers were placed under the control of the regimental medical officer and were attached to the regimental aid post, and acted as bearers, guides and runners. If.we liken the regimental stretcher bearers to the body of a kite, these four to eight R.A.M.C. bearers form the tail of the kite-the tail being inseparable from the body.
When the regimental aid post was moved forward and established in a new position, a squad of the attached R.A.M.C. bearers would take a case back to the former regimental aid post, which in turn became a relay post, and there the case would be handed over; and other bearers would proceed forward to the new regimental aid post, being guided by one or more of the R.A.M.C. bearers attached to it. The service of these guides was essential, especially during operations in open warfare at night.
In addition, the brigade bearer officer, who was also a medical liaison officer, was attached to and lived at brigade headquarters; he was not, however, under the orders of the brigade, but was under the orders and control of the field ambulance commander concerned. Tnis arrangement worked admirably in practice. The brigade bearer and liaison officer was in direct communication with battalion headquarters, and he received information as soon as it was received by the brigade-that is, before divisional headquarters and the A.D.M.S. were informed. In addition, his duties included constant visits to the regimental aid posts; keeping a strict watch over the supply of blankets and stretchers; sending back word through the car-loading post for any requirements, and always watching for a favourable opportunity to move the car-loading post to a more advanced position, in order to lighten the work of the bearers by substituting motor transport for hand carriage or wheeled stretcher as early as possible.
The general arrangement for the supply and dispositions of reserves of stretchers, blankets and bearer personnel during a battle is best shown by diagrams. A constant stream forward of stretchers and blankets must be maintained to take the place of those in use. The supply of this equipment has to be arranged on a definite plan, so that the regimental medical officer knows where he can obtain the necessary articles without delay.
If the A.D.M.S. holds up a portion of the bearers as a reserve, it makes it difficult for the ambulance commander in charge of evacuation of stretcher cases to arrange for reliefs and much needed rest, without which the system of evacuation would collapse. The best results were obtained by handing over all the bearers to the ambulance commander concerned, and as A.D.M.S. I held, as a reserve, 100 to 150 fighting troops, who were located as a rule in the vicinity of one of the field ambulance headquarters, the site being determined according to circumstances.
(III) Before active operations the following conferences were usually held: One between the divisional commander and his staff, another between the D.D.M.S. of the Corps and A.Ds.M.S. of divisions, and another between the A.D.M.S. and field ambulance commanders and seconds in command.
At the divisional commanders' conferences before an attack on Lens in 1917, a plasticine model to scale of the field of operations was shown, and it was of the greatest assistance to those concerned to visualize the position of our objectives and the nature of the obstacles to be overbome; the various lines of trenches, the belts of wire, the contours, and the position of the roads or tracks.
In open warfare, however, it was never possible to have models of this description and we had to be content with maps. At these conferences the A.D.M.S. would learn what our objectives were; the boundaries of our area before and after the advance; where the greatest resistance would be expected, and consequently the heaviest casualties; what roads or tracks would be used by the artillery and infantry respectively; what roads it was the intention of the divisional commander to keep open as far as possible with all available labour; the situation of craters or other obstructions to transport.
At this conference the A.D.M.S. would decide with the divisional commander's approval what road would constitute the main channel of evacuation; and when this important point had been settled, the approximate sites of advanced dressing stations could be selected, and in this way the. foundations of the medical arrangements laid. During the autumn of 1918 when our attacks succeeded one another at very short intervals (on some occasions without any interval at all) conferences were not always held and the A.D.M.S. would obtain the necessary information from the General Staff.
In connexion with the question of written orders the usual sequence in which orders and instructions were issued before operations was as follows:- Before discussing the scheme of medical arrangements in open warfare I' must refer to two points, the importance of which must be realized by the administrative medical officer, otherwise the medical units under his command may be the means of imperilling the success of the whole military operations.
They are secrecy and the maintenance of a high standard of traffic and march discipline. Speaking as a non-combatant it appeared to me that military success in open warfare depended more on efficient traffic and march discipline than on any other factors; without them ammunition and supplies cannot reach the troops and the heavy artillery cannot advance, and incidentally, the transportation of woiunded becomes a very serious problem. March discipline has been described as the ceremonial of war-interpreted in medical terms it meant, never under any circumstances to allow the field ambulance transport to be overloaded, as an overloaded wagon may break down and become the starting point of a serious block in the traffic.
As regards traffic discipline it meant not only complying with the instructions laid down for traffic on the various routes, but it also meant strict compliance with the order to keep an interval of so many yards between every twenty vehicles when the transport of a column was on the line of march.
The personnel of the field ambulances grasped the importance of these principles so well that on no single occasion did I hear any complaint on this score. The practical outcome as regards the wounded was that in open warfare we were given a free hand as regards the position of medical posts including main dressing stations, where the movements of the divisional motor ambulances and the M.A.C. might be the cause of serious trouble, unless suitable arrangements for traffic bad been made beforehand, including a separate entrance and exit to the main dressing station and ample space for parking ambulances.
I may mention that I have seen, in the course of operations, a first-class road for "two-way " traffic entirely blocked by wheeled transport for a distance of over seven miles. This utfortunate incident occurred in a column of one of our allies and I understood that the road remained blocked for about twentyfour hours.
(IV) (a) We will now consider the medical arrangements in an attack with a subsequent advance of some miles. Experience showed that these conditions were the least difficult in which to organize satisfactory medical arrangements, in spite of the following complications: (1) The communications having become lengthened; (2) The size of the divisional area having increased considerably; (3) The blowing-up or obstruction of roads.
Grattan: Medical Organization in Open Warfare
The reasons why these conditions were less difficult to deal with than those involved in a hostile attack or counter attack, were as follows:-(1) The initiative being in our hands, the A.D.M.S. made his plans, and informed all concerned what those plans were, with due regard to secrecy, and he carried them out resolutely to the end.
(2) The difficulties due to lengthened communications were neutralized by the advantages accruing from motor transport, both for the evacuation of wounded and for bringing forward medical personnel and equipment, and also for dealing with the problem of obstructions and defects in roads, as R.E. personnel, material and mechanical devices for removing obstructions can be brought up with a minimum of delay.
It is most important to draw up the broad outlines of your scheme of transportation and to decide what is to be your main channel of evacuation during the advance, and after the objectives have been taken, bearing in mind that it economizes personnel to have one divisional route of evacuation, although under certain circumstances it may be necessary to have two.
Knowledge of the situation of this route or channel will enable those interested to grasp at once the foundation on which the scheme for rendering medical aid is based, and bearer officers and regimental medical officers can formulate and co-ordinate their plans, with the object of bringing the stretcher cases to a series of definite points, if possible in a direction towards the main channel of evacuation.
In an attack arrangements would be made for three advanced dressing stations, staffed and equipped by three tent subdivisions. The first would be open and working before the attack, the second would be in readiness to advance immediately when ordered by the A.D.M.S., while the third would be held in reserve. The administration and handling of the advanced dressing stations would be allotted to B ambulance commander who would also control the fifteen divisional motor ambulances, less the six Ford cars which are apportioned to the three bearer divisions under the control of A ambulance commander. The arrangements for dealing with the walking wounded would be controlled by the third or C field ambulance commander with a complete tent division, all the horsed ambulances, and half-a-dozen motor lorries usually provided by the Corps-this ambulance commander would establish a divisional walking wounded station with 'two tent subdivisions, his third subdivision being utilized as a collecting post, which is the counterpart of the A.D.S. for stretcher cases.
As the troops advance the collecting post is expanded into a new divisional walking wounded station and a more advanced collecting post established by one of the three tent subdivisions allotted for this purpose.
(b) The Hostile Counter-attack. -My conception of the medical arrangements necessary in the event of a counter-attack consisted in the closing of the most forward advanced dressing station, in the opening of another in a position 1,000 yards or so farther back, and also in the moving up of more bearers. Additional arrangements which proved to be necessary on one occasion, involved the establishment of an entirely new route of evacuation at right angles to our original main channel and 5 miles distant from and parallel with our front. Another unforeseen complication occurred, namely, the fact that the transport of the field ambulance on the right narrowly escaped capture. We were all taken unawares as the counter-attack came in the wrong place and on the wrong day.
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(c) Only brief reference can be made to the medical problems that have to be considered during an intensive and continued hostile attack like the German offensive in the spring of 1918. The administration of the medical services under these conditions was very difficult. From the point of view of a division and corps it is the situation in which a medical catastrophe is most likely to occur. The circumstances are difficult for many obvious reasons, for when the initiative is in the hands of the enemy, we do not know what his plans and objectives are. In my experience the special medical problem for consideration was the transportation of stretcher cases to the C.C.S. from the M.D.S. or A.D.S. and the calamity to be guarded against was the capture of numbers of lying cases. This we were successful in avoiding, with the exception that one advanced dressing station was captured. The paucity of information regarding the military situation and the hindrance to communication by signal or otherwise owing to acts of the enemy all added to our difficulties. In addition, motor lorries that were usually allotted for the conveyance of walking wounded were urgently required for other purposes; there was the likelihood that fighting troops as additional bearers might not be forthcoming, and the " fog " of war added to the general embarrassment. The general principle in handling the medical units of a division in these circumstances is to establish a series of advanced dressing stations and walking wounded collecting posts in 6chelon, and to inform ambulance commanders that they must delegate the responsibility of vacating these advanced posts, and withdrawing to the next echelon, to the officers in charge of the post.
The main dressing station must similarly be organized in echelon with one tent subdivision ready to open up and carry on in the new position while the remaining tent subdivisions close and prepare to withdraw. As the work of the bearers presents special difficulties the task of evacuation from the forward area should be handed over to two ambulance commanders. Owing to the difficulty of communications, it is of special importance for either the A.D.M.S. or the D.A.D.M.S. to make frequent visits to the various posts, in order to keep in touch with the needs of the constantly changing situation.
For want of time I am unable to discuss the role of an A.D.M.S. during a battle, or to deal with the organization of Corps Medical Institutions, relative to their advantages and disadvantages, and the circumstances which indicate or contra-indicate their employment.
DISCUSSION.
Mr. C. MAX PAGE said that the author had presented the details of an important subject in a clear and interesting way. He (Mr. Page) felt that the uncertain link in the chain of evacuation was always bound to lie in the sector between the Regimental Aid Post and the A,.D.S. The common experience had been that the transport of the wounded man in this area was always greatly facilitated when motor ambulances could be pushed close up to the firing line. Such an arrangement also correspondingly economized the use of bearers. He felt that in any future war an effort should be made to supply splinter-proof ambulances or perhaps caterpillar trucks to assist the medical evacuation of the forward area. He asked Colonel Grattan for his opinion as to the practicability of such a proposition.
Lieutenant-Colonel P. H. HENDERSON said he agreed with the last speaker in regard to sending the ambulance cars as far forward as was reasonably possible in order to collect severely wounded during an engagement. In this connexion, up to the time he left France at the end of 1915, he was afraid there appeared to be a tendency to take too much care of the cars, and in consequence their usefulness was limited.
Cars could be m'nore easily repaired and replaced than wounded soldiers. During the Battle of Loos unnecessary caution was disregarded in the Seventh Division and the cars were eventually sent along the Hulluch road up to and in front of the A.D.S., and thus the lives of men, who could not have been got away with reasonable expedition by any other means at the disposal of the Division, were saved. By pushing the cars forward one also saved the lives and conserved the energies of the over-worked stretcher-bearers. Colonel Grattan indicated at the beginning of his address an instance in which evacuation of wounded was rendered difficult by the fact that roads ran at right angles to the line of advance. Had aeroplanes ever been used for evacuation of wounded? He (Colonel Henderson) was of opinion that the solution of this difficulty and of the problem of getting severely wounded men and particularly abdominal cases to a surgical centre or hospital in sufficient time to save their lives lay in the use of aeroplanes. He would not suggest now the nearest point to the firing line to which an aeroplane might proceed to pick up wounded; that could only be determined on the spot and must be regulated by local conditions. It would save many lives if cases could be got to a surgical centre in two or three hours as compared with the six hours which Colonel Grattan indicated as the time arrived at as being the best that could be hoped for under our present means of transport. The address dealt entirely with conditions prevailing on the Western Front where the maximum frontage of a division was about 6 to 7 miiles. In this respect and in many others the conditions differed very widely from those met with in other theatres of war-in Macedonia for instance, the frontage of some divisions was nearer 40 miles. It was suggested that the conditions under which future wars would probably be fought were more likely to approximate to those met with in the calmlpaigns in Macedonia, Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Indian Frontier, and it was therefore unwise to base one's plans for future wars too closely on the experiences of the Western Front. For instance, in the later stages of the war in France the D.D.M.S. of the Corps selected the sites of the main dressing stations of the Divisional Field Ambulances. This procedure would be inmpossible on the extended fronts and with the means of communication met wTth, say, in Macedonia. Another point of importance for consideration was the question of the mllost suitable means of transport, particularly in divisional areas where there might be no roads for ambulance cars or even tracks suitable for horsed wagons. Under such conditions litters and travois had to be used and here a word of warning with reward to travois was necessary. Whilst they were a comfortable means of transport across suitable country they had the grave defect of being very apt to pick up and cut-particularly at night-the ground wires laid during an advance. Several instances of this had occurred tluring th.6war and at a critical stage of operations Divisional Headquarters had been found to be cut off from communication with Brigade Headquarters. Colonel Grattan had demonstrated the importance of rapid evacuation of casualties from the battlefield and had shown how he carried this out by means of collecting an ample supply of stretchers in the aid posts, advanced dressing stations and divisional area, and by maeans of establishing a system of communication between the original aid post and newly formed ones. This was all most important. The method of keeping up communication he (Colonel Henderson) had adopted in the Division in which he was A.D.M.S. had worked successfully. It was as follows: All roads and tracks from the unit aid posts to advanced dressing stations, and to divisional collecting station and main dressing stations were carefully marked by notice boards and arrows which were placed in position on the evening before the engagement started. At the commencement of the engagement the regimental sanitary detachments, which were normally idle during active fighting, were attached to the Regimental Medical Officer and each carried a small bundle of Red Cross flags made from triangular bandages. These were secured to light sticks about four feet long. As a battalion advanced and new aid posts and collecting points were formed one of these flagged sticks was stuck in the ground to mark the site and one man of the sanitary detachment then proceeded to the original aid post or to the advanced dressing station and led the field ambulance stretcher bearers to the new points where wounded were collected by the regimental bearers. This system had worked so well that it was well worth a trial by regimental medical officers.
Major-General Sir W. MACPHERSON said that Colonel Grattan had led him to understand that preparations in the way of stretchers, blankets, personnel, &e., were of minor importance, but he (Sir William Macpherson) could not imagine any greater preparations for battle on the part of the administrative medical authorities than those for replenishing stretchers, blankets and personnel. Those were the very details which should be carefully considered and prepared for in anticipation of battle. The maintenance of secrecy with regard to the arrangements was highly important, and in this respect he had found the General Staff much more anxious to let the administrative medical officer know sufficiently early the nature of the operations that were contemplated. Personally he had always received from the General Staff, from the Army Commander under whom he had served, and from the Commander-in-Chief, the very greatest help in this respect. They had trusted one to maintain secrecy; but he had not been kept so well informed by the Adjutant-General's branch; no doubt the Adjutant-General's braneh had not the same faith in the maintenance of secrecy as the General Staff. Colonel Grattan had informed them that in his division 1,000 stretchers and 2,000 blankets were maintained. How had Colonel Grattan managed to carry these in the event of an advance or retreat? He seemed to have accumulated an unnecessarily large number of these articles; the procedure for replenishing stretchers and blankets which had been laid down by Corps and Army Ds.M.S. would have sufficed to keep Colonel Grattan supplied with whatever he wanted. At the battle of Loos he (Sir William Macpherson) had found some divisions doing what Colonel Grattan apparently had done, and forming large dumps of stretchers, with the result that the dumps arranged by the D.M.S. for replenishing the field ambulances were rapidly exhausted and had to be restored. Before this battle every field ambulance had been given, to begin with, fifty extra stretchers, and they were replenished by the motor ambulance cars of the motor ambulance convoy bringing up stretchers. from the dumps at the casualty clearing stations to the field ambulances as required. The system had worked well, and there had been no complaint of want of stretchers. Colonel Grattan had made the remark that it was best to maintain only one route of evacuation for a division, but this he (Sir William Macpherson) thought was a mistake. Colonel Grattan had shown them the effect of having only one route of evacuation at the time of the German counter attack from Cambrai in 1917, and had said that the attack and the direction in which it was made were unexpected. He (Sir William Macpherson) would have thought, from the position of the salient on the flank of the divisional route of evacuation, that that was exactly the direction in which the attack would have been made, and in these circumstances it would have been far better, instead of depending on one divisional route of evacuation, to have arranged for collateral routes. Colonel Henderson had somewhat severely criticized the practice of not allowing motor ambulance cars to come up to regimental aid posts; but Sir WVilliam Macpherson considered that the sending of motor ambulance cars up to regimental aid posts was unjustifiable. The life of the car and the lives of the drivers and the wounded in it had to be considered, and although it might be possible to get away very quickly some severely wounded from a regimental aid post by means of motor ambulance cars, the chances were that there would be a greater loss of life and greater interference with evacuation by having cars damaged; this had occurred on more than one occasion during the battles on the Ypres salient. It was always better to bring back wounded from regimental aid posts by relays of bearers, light railways, or on wheeled stretchers to the advanced dressing stations, than to run the risk of losing motor ambulance cars by sending them too far forward. Relays of bearers, &c., could always come back over unsafe ground with less chances of being hit than could an ambulance car working on a recognized road where it was bound to be heavily shelled.
Major T. B. LAYTON thought that Colonel Grattan's paper showed the protean nature of modern warfare. It would be well to subdivide open warfare into three:
(a) Semi-mobile, as instanced by the last stages of the war in France; (b) mobile, as instanced by Allenby's campaign in the autumn of 1917; and (c) very mobile, as exemplified by the leap to Aleppo in 1918. Colonel Grattan had rightly laid stress on the six-hour ideal of wound to operating table: but in all their advances in the late war he (Major Layton) doubted whether there was any improvement in this on the South African war in a mlobile or very mnobile campaign. He felt confident that rapid transport could only be attained by collection of wounded by aeroplane, or by the pushing up of mobile operating units on tank transport to the field of battle on the evening of the engagement. He thought that warfare in the future would become more and more mobile, and urged that the study of the lessons of the war derived from the campaigns in Salonica, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Africa were of greater importance than the lessons derivable from France. He feared that these Near East and African canmpaigns were being neglected in comparison with that on the Western Front.
Colonel GRATTAN (in reply) said he considered Mr. Max Page's suggestions were practical, and he felt sure they would receive consideration by the authorities concerned.
In regard to Colonel Henderson's observations, he (Colonel Grattan) explained that his paper was based on experience on the Western Front only. He mlust have expressed himself badly if he had conveyed the impression to Major-General Sir Wim. Macpherson that the provision of an adequate supply of stretchers and bearer personnel was of minor importance. He (Colonel Grattan) had stated that these were routine matters, nevertheless he considered them so important that he drew up a definite plan for the supply of these requirements before every battle, and had shown diagrams during the course of the evening which illustrated the methods he adop1Eed to keep the regimental medical officer supplied with stretchers, and the brigade bearer officers with reinforcemnents of bearer personnel in case of necessity. The stretchers and blankets surplus to mobilization equipment were carried on lorries supplied by the D.D.M.S. of the Corps or by Divisional Headquarters. The direction of the hostile counter-attack at Camlbrai should have been anticipated, and suitable arrangellments made accordingly. He thought Major Layton's suggestions were most valuable, and he felt sure that they would not be lost sight of.
